MARC details
| 000 -LEADER |
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| fixed length control field |
04084cam a2200301 a 4500 |
| 001 - CONTROL NUMBER |
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| control field |
4630 |
| 003 - CONTROL NUMBER IDENTIFIER |
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| control field |
BD-DhEWU |
| 005 - DATE AND TIME OF LATEST TRANSACTION |
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| control field |
20140721103500.0 |
| 008 - FIXED-LENGTH DATA ELEMENTS--GENERAL INFORMATION |
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| fixed length control field |
021219s2003 enk g b 001 0 eng d |
| 020 ## - INTERNATIONAL STANDARD BOOK NUMBER |
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| International Standard Book Number |
184064737x |
| 035 ## - SYSTEM CONTROL NUMBER |
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| System control number |
(OCoLC)51804727 |
| 040 ## - CATALOGING SOURCE |
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| Original cataloging agency |
BDS |
| Language of cataloging |
eng |
| Transcribing agency |
BD-DhEWU |
| Modifying agency |
BD-DhEWU |
| 041 ## - LANGUAGE CODE |
|---|
| Language code of text/sound track or separate title |
eng |
| 082 00 - DEWEY DECIMAL CLASSIFICATION NUMBER |
|---|
| Classification number |
330.01 |
| Edition number |
21 |
| Item number |
TRU 2003 |
| 245 00 - TITLE STATEMENT |
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| Title |
Trust / |
| Statement of responsibility, etc |
edited by Elias L. Khalil. |
| 260 ## - PUBLICATION, DISTRIBUTION, ETC. (IMPRINT) |
|---|
| Place of publication, distribution, etc |
Cheltenham : |
| Name of publisher, distributor, etc |
Elgar, |
| Date of publication, distribution, etc |
2003. |
| 300 ## - PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION |
|---|
| Extent |
xxxii, 772 p. ; |
| Dimensions |
25 cm. |
| 505 0# - FORMATTED CONTENTS NOTE |
|---|
| Formatted contents note |
Introduction: why does trustworthiness pay? three answers, Elias L. Khalil. Part 1 Trust as strategy: Adam Smith and the prisoners' dilemma, Gordon Tullock; the further evolution of cooperation, Robert Axelrod and Douglas Dion; there are many evolutionary pathways to cooperations, Jack Hirshleifer; credible commitments - using hostages to support exchange, Oliver E. Williamson; rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, David M. Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts and Robert Wilson; learning to be imperfect - the ultimatum game, John gale, Kenneth G. Binmore and Larry Samuelson; neither friends nor strangers - informal networks of subcontracting in French industry, Edward H. Lorenz; kinship, contract and trust - the economic organization of migrants in an African city slum, Keith Hart; the emergence of exchange structures - an experimental study of uncertainty, commitment and trust, Peter Kollock; coordination, commitment and enforcement - the case of the merchant guild, Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom and Barry R. Weingast; calculativeness, trust and economic organization, Oliver E. Williamson; trust, opportunism and governance - a process and control model, Bart Nooteboom; on the emotional character of trust, Bernd Lahno. Part 2 Trust as taste: fairness and retaliation - the economics of reciprocity, Ernst Fehr and Simon Gachter; ultimatum bargaining behavior - a survey and comparison of experimental results, Werner Guth and Reinhard Tietz; bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalam, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo - an experimental study, Alvin E. Roth, Vesna Prasnikar, Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara and Shmuel Zamir; in search of homo economicus - behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies, Joseph Henrich et al; why free ride? strategies and learning in public goods experiments, James Andreoni; cooperation, Richard H. Thaler and Robyn M. Dawes; trust, reciprocity and social history, Joyce Berg, John Dickhaut and Kevin McCabe; trust, reciprocity and social history - a re-examination, Andreas Ortmann, John Fitzgerald and Carl Boeing; fairness as a constraint on profit seeking - entitlements in the market, Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard Thaler; labor contracts as a partial gift exchange, George A. Akerlof; incorporating fairness into game theory and economics, Matthew Rabin; modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments, David K. Levine;the case for a multi-utility conception, Amitai Etzioni; rational fools - a critique of the bevioral foundations of economic theory, Amartya K. Sen; sentimental fools - a critique of Amartya Sen's notion of committment, Elias L. Khalil. Part 3 Trust as trait: evolution and the stability of cooperation without enforceable contracts, Ulrich Witt; co-evolution of preferences and information in simple games of trust, Werner Guth, Hartmut Kliemt and Bezalel Peleg; explaining reciprocal beavior in simple strategic games - an evolutionary approach, Werner Guth. (Part contents). |
| Title |
TOC |
| 520 ## - SUMMARY, ETC. |
|---|
| Summary, etc |
This collection includes previously published, broad-ranging articles that are organized into three parts, expressing three definite answers to the question posed in the introduction: why does trustworthiness pay? |
| 526 ## - STUDY PROGRAM INFORMATION NOTE |
|---|
| Program name |
Economics |
| 590 ## - LOCAL NOTE (RLIN) |
|---|
| Local note |
Shaharima Parvin |
| 650 #0 - SUBJECT ADDED ENTRY--TOPICAL TERM |
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Trust. |
| 9 (RLIN) |
3830 |
|
|---|
| Topical term or geographic name as entry element |
Economics. |
| 9 (RLIN) |
16223 |
| 700 1# - ADDED ENTRY--PERSONAL NAME |
|---|
| Personal name |
Khalil, Elias L., |
| Dates associated with a name |
1957- |
| 9 (RLIN) |
16224 |
| 830 #0 - SERIES ADDED ENTRY--UNIFORM TITLE |
|---|
| Uniform title |
Critical studies in economic institutions |
| 9 (RLIN) |
16227 |
| 856 42 - ELECTRONIC LOCATION AND ACCESS |
|---|
| Materials specified |
WorldCat details |
| Uniform Resource Identifier |
http://www.worldcat.org/title/trust/oclc/51804727&referer=brief_results |
| 942 ## - ADDED ENTRY ELEMENTS (KOHA) |
|---|
| Source of classification or shelving scheme |
Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Koha item type |
Text |